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Abstract
Let κ, λ be regular cardinals, λ ď κ, let ϕ be a sentence of the language Lκ,λ in a given
signature, and let ϑpϕq express the fact that ϕ holds in a submodel, i.e., any model A in
the signature satisfies ϑpϕq if and only if some submodel B of A satisfies ϕ. It was shown
in [1] that, whenever ϕ is in Lκ,ω in the signature having less than κ functional symbols (and
arbitrarily many predicate symbols), then ϑpϕq is equivalent to a monadic existential sentence
in the second-order language L2κ,ω, and that for any signature having at least one binary
predicate symbol there exists ϕ in Lω,ω such that ϑpϕq is not equivalent to any (first-order)
sentence in L8,ω. Nevertheless, in certain cases ϑpϕq are first-order expressible. In this note,
we provide several (syntactical and semantical) characterizations of the case when ϑpϕq is in
Lκ,κ and κ is ω or a certain large cardinal.
Given a model-theoretic language L (in sense of [2]) and a sentence ϕ in L, let ϑpϕq express
the fact that ϕ is satisfied in a submodel. Thus for any model A,
A ( ϑpϕq iff B ( ϕ for some submodel B of A.
We study when ϑpϕq, considered a priori as a meta-expression, is equivalent to a sentence in
another (perhaps, the same) given model-theoretic language L1. Such questions naturally arise in
studies of modal logics of submodels; if L is closed under ϑ, then ϑ induces a modal operator on
sentences (where a possibility of ϕ means the satisfiability of ϕ in a submodel), and the resulting
modal logic can be regarded as a fragment of L with the submodel relation on a given class of
models. These logics are an instance of modal logics of various model-theoretic relations, which
were introduced and studied in [1]; another instance is modal logic of forcing (see, e.g., [3]). As
another source of motivation for studies undertaken in this note, let us point out the paper [4]
discussing reduction of higher-order logics to second-order one.
Here we concentrate on first-order languages Lκ,λ. Recall that Lω,ω is the usual first-order
finitary language; Lκ,λ expands it by involving Boolean connectives of any arities ă κ and quan-
tifiers over ă λ first-order variables, where λ ď κ are given regular cardinals; and L8,λ is the
union of Lκ,λ for all κ; see [2], [5], [6]. It was shown in [1] that, even for ϕ in Lω,ω, it is possible
that ϑpϕq is not in L8,ω; on the other hand, ϑpϕq is equivalent to a second-order (in general,
infinitary) sentence; these results are reproduced as Theorems 4 and 5 below. Nevertheless, in
certain cases ϑpϕq are first-order expressible. In this note, we provide several (syntactical as well
as semantical) characterizations of the case when ϑpϕq is equivalent to a sentence in Lκ,κ and κ
is either ω or a certain large (e.g., compact) cardinal.
We start with some obvious observations, which confirm, in particular, that ϑ behaves like
an S4 possibility operator.
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Proposition 1. For any sentences ϕ, ψ, and ϕi, i P I, in a model-theoretic language L involving
the syntactic operations under consideration, we have:
(i) ϑpJq is equivalent to J, and ϑpKq is equivalent to K;
(ii) ϕ implies ϑpϕq;
(iii) ϑpϕq is equivalent to ϑpϑpϕqq;
(iv) ϕÑ ψ implies ϑpϕq Ñ ϑpψq;
(v) ϑp
Ź
iPI ϕiq implies
Ź
iPI ϑpϕiq, and ϑp
Ž
iPI ϕiq is equivalent to
Ž
iPI ϑpϕiq;
(vi)  ϑpϕq implies  ϕ, and  ϕ implies ϑp ϕq;
(vii) ϑp ϑpϕqq implies ϑp ϕq.
Proof. Items (i)–(v) are immediate; (vi) follows from (ii); and (vii) from (iv) and (vi).
Corollary 2. For every sentence ϕ, the sentence ϑpϕq is preserved under extensions of models.
A fortiori, it is preserved under elementary extensions, unions of increasing chains of models; in
purely predicate signatures: under direct unions, direct products and powers; etc.
Proof. This follows from item (iii) of Proposition 1.
Given cardinals κ, µ with µ ě κ, recall that κ is µ-compact iff the language Lκ,κ satisfies the
pµ, κq-compactness, i.e., any theory in Lκ,κ of cardinality ď µ has a model whenever each its
subtheory of cardinality ă κ has a model. A cardinal κ is weakly compact iff it is κ-compact, and
strongly compact iff it is µ-compact for all µ ě κ (e.g., ω is strongly compact). By a compact
cardinal κ we shall mean strongly compact κ, and by an inaccessible, a strongly inaccessible, i.e.,
a regular κ such that 2λ ă κ for all λ ă κ. For more on these and other large cardinals and their
connections with infinitary languages, we refer the reader to [5], [6].
Corollary 3. Let κ be ω or, more generally, a compact cardinal, and ϕ a sentence in Lκ,κ. The
following are equivalent:
(i) ϑpϕq is equivalent to a sentence in Lκ,κ;
(ii) ϑpϕq is equivalent to a sentence in Σ0
1
pLκ,κq, i.e., an existential sentence in Lκ,κ.
Proof. (i)Ñ(ii). By Corollary 2 since sentences in Lκ,κ that are preserved under extensions are
exactly existential ones (for κ “ ω see [7]; for compact κ ą ω, modify the same argument).
Two following results on expressibility of ϑpϕq were essentially obtained in [1]. They show that
the expressibility generally does not hold in first-order languages but is achieved in appropriate
second-order ones.
Theorem 4. For any signature τ having a predicate symbol R of arity at least 2, there exists
a sentence ϕ in Lω,ω such that ϑpϕq is not equivalent to any sentence in L8,ω.
Proof. Suppose w.l.g. that R is a binary predicate symbol (otherwise imitate it by using a pred-
icate symbol of a bigger arity with fixed other arguments). Let ϕ be an obvious Lω,ω-sentence
saying that there exists no R-minimal element. Then  ϑpϕq says that each submodel has a R-
minimal element. Note that, if τ has no functional symbols,  ϑpϕq says that R is well-founded.
As well-known, the latter property is not expressible in L8,ω (moreover, it is not RPC in L8,ω;
see, e.g., [2], Chapter 9, Theorem 3.2.20), which proves the theorem for such τ . In the general
case, we argue as follows.
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Toward a contradiction, assume that there is κ such that ϑpϕq is equivalent to some ψ P Lκ,ω.
It follows from Karp’s theorem (see, e.g., [8], Theorem 14.29) that there are models A0 and B0
of the subsignature τ0 “ tRu such that A0 is isomorphic to an ordinal while B0 is not, and
A0 ”Lκ,ω B0. Expand A0 and B0 respectively to models A and B of τ by interpreting each
predicate symbol other than R by the empty set, each functional symbol of positive arity by the
projection onto the first argument, and each constant symbol by the R-last element of the model
(which w.l.g. can be assumed to exist). It is easy to see that in both A and B any formula of τ is
equivalent to a formula of τ0; so we still have A ”Lκ,ω B. On the other hand, in both models every
subset forms a submodel whenever it contains the R-last element of the whole model, whence it
easily follows that A ( ψ and B (  ψ. A contradiction.
Given a model-theoretic language L, let Lα denote the αth-order extension of L. A for-
mula of L2 is monadic iff it involves only unary predicate variables, and existential second-order,
respectively, universal second-order iff it involves only existential, respectively, universal quan-
tifiers over second-order variables preceding a first-order formula (with arbitrary quantifiers).
The monadic fragment of L2 consists of its monadic formulas; similarly for the existential and
universal fragments of the language, which will be denoted by Σ1
1
pL2q and Π1
1
pL2q, respectively.
Theorem 5. Let κ be a regular cardinal and ϕ a (first-order) sentence of Lκ,ω in a signature τ
with ă κ functional (including constant) symbols and arbitrarily many predicate symbols. Then
ϑpϕq is equivalent to a monadic existential formula in L2κ,ω. Moreover, the following languages
are closed under ϑ:
(i) the monadic fragment of L2κ,λ for any λ ď κ;
(ii) the existential fragment of L2κ,λ for any λ ď κ;
(iii) Lακ,λ for any λ ď κ and α ě 2.
Proof. If X is a second-order unary predicate variable, for each functional symbol F in τ let ψF
be an L2ω,ω-formula stating that X is closed under F , and let ψpXq be the L
2
κ,ω-formula
Dx
`
Xpxq ^
ľ
tψF pXq : F is a functional symbol in τu
˘
stating that X forms a submodel. Then ϑpϕq is equivalent to the sentence
DX
`
ψpXq ^ ϕX
˘
where ϕX is the relativization of ϕ to X.
As usual, a filter D is κ-complete iff
Ş
E P D for all E P PκpDq, where PκpAq denotes the set
of all subsets of A which have cardinality ă κ.
Corollary 6. Let κ be ω or, more generally, a compact cardinal, and ϕ a sentence in Lκ,κ in
a signature with ă κ functional (including constant) symbols. Then ϑpϕq is preserved under
ultraproducts by κ-complete ultrafilters. Moreover, this remains true for sentences ϕ in Σ1
1
pL2κ,κq.
Proof. By Theorem 5, for such a ϕ the statement ϑpϕq is equivalent to a Σ1
1
pL2κ,κq-sentence,
therefore, it is preserved under ultraproducts (for κ “ ω see, e.g., [7], Corollary 4.1.14; for
compact κ modify the same argument).
The next result on non-expressibility of ϑpϕq shows that the restriction on the number of
functional symbols in Theorem 5 is optimal.
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Theorem 7. For any signature τ having ě κ functional (e.g., constant) symbols, there exists
a sentence ϕ of Lω,ω (in fact, in the empty signature) such that ϑpϕq is not equivalent to any
sentence in Lακ,κ for all α, and moreover, in every language L whose formulas ψ have cardinality
|ψ| ă κ.
Proof. Clearly, it suffices to consider only a signature τ consisting of κ constant symbols, say,
cα, α ă κ. Let ϕ be the sentence @x@y x “ y; then ϑpϕq states the existence of a single-point
submodel. Toward a contradiction, assume that such an L has some ψ equivalent to ϑpϕq. Let
two models A and B in τ have the same two-point universe ta, bu, and let for all α ă κ,
cAα :“ a, and c
B
α :“
"
a if cα occurs in ψ,
b otherwise.
Since |ψ| ă κ, there exists α ă κ such that cBα “ b. So we have: A ( ψ iff B ( ψ (as A and B
satisfy the same formulas involving only symbols from ψ), however, A ( ϑpϕq and B (  ϑpϕq
(as the singleton tau forms a submodel of A while B has no single-point submodels).
Let ϑďλpϕq denote that ϕ is satisfied in a submodel generated by a set of cardinality ď λ.
Obviously, ϑďλpϕq implies ϑpϕq. We are going to show that ϑďλpϕq is an existential sentence
in an appropriate first-order language. To simplify some formulations, we shall consider partial
models in which their operations can be only partial. An atomic diagram of a partial model A
is defined in the same way as for usual models with total operations, i.e., it consists of all true
in A atomic and negated atomic sentences of the language expanded by constant symbols for all
elements of A.
Lemma 8. Let κ be ω or, more generally, an inaccessible cardinal, λ ă κ, and ϕ a sentence in
Lκ,κ in a signature τ with ă κ functional (including constant) symbols. Then ϑďλpϕq is equivalent
to an existential sentence in Lκ,κ.
Proof. Let us first consider signatures τ without functional symbols. Then ϑďλpϕq is clearly
equivalent to the first-order sentence
Dαăλ xα ϕ
txα:αăλu
where ϕtxα:αăλu is the relativization of ϕ to the set of (first-order) variables xα, α ă λ, which
do not occur in ϕ. Let us verify that the relativization is equivalent to an open formula in
Lκ,κpτq (with parameters xα, α ă λ); it will clearly follow that Dαăλ xα ϕ
txα:αăλu is equivalent
to a Σ0
1
pLκ,κq-sentence.
Indeed, ϕtxα:αăλu is obtained from ϕ by successively replacing each subformula Dβăγ yβ ψ
with the Lκ,κ-formula
Dβăγ yβ
`
ψ ^
ľ
βăγ
ł
αăλ
yβ “ xα
˘
.
The latter formula is equivalent to the formula
Dβăγ yβ
`
ψ ^
ł
fPλγ
ľ
βăγ
yβ “ xfpβq
˘
,
which is still in Lκ,κ since |λ
γ | ă κ due to the condition that κ is inaccessible, and furthermore,
to the open formula ł
fPλγ
ψpyβ{xfpβqqβăγ
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where ψpyβ{xfpβqqβăγ is obtained from ψ by substituting each variable yβ with the variable xfpβq.
This eliminates all quantifiers in all subformulas of ϕ txα:αăλu, as required.
In the general case, the construction is slightly more complex. Let τ 1 expand τ by λ new
constant symbols cα, α ă λ. We still have |τ
1| ă κ. Hence, since κ is inaccessible, there exist
only ă κ pairwise non-isomorphic partial models in τ 1 satisfying ϕ with the universe constisting
of an interpretion of all closed terms; say, Bβ, β ă µ, for some µ ă κ. Note that, though such
partial models may have size ą λ (they interpret not only the cα but all terms constructed from
them), all they have size ď ν for some fixed ν with λ ď ν ă κ. For any β ă µ, let ∆β be the
atomic diagram of Bβ , and ψβ its conjunction
Ź
∆β, which is still in Lκ,κ as |∆β| ă κ. Let xα,
α ă λ, be variables not occurring in ∆β, and let ϕβ be the formula ψβpcα{xαq obtained from ψβ
by replacing each constant symbol cα with the variable xα. Then ϕβ is an open formula in τ ,
and the Σ0
1
pLκ,κq-sentence
Dαăλ xα ϕβpxαqαăλ
characterizes the partial model Bβ up to isomorphism. It follows that ϑďλpϕq is equivalent to
the Σ0
1
pLκ,κq-sentence
Dαăλ xα
ł
βăµ
ϕβpxαqαăλ.
This completes the proof.
Remark 1. The argument shows that, whenever κ is an inaccessible cardinal ą ω, then moreover,
ϑďλpϕq is equivalent to an existential sentence in Lκ,λ` . Also we can see that Lemma 8 remains
true for signatures with ăκ-ary symbols. For τ with ě κ functional symbols, even ϑď1pϕq is
non-expressible in any language with formulas of size ă κ, by the proof of Theorem 7.
A fragment of a model A is an its partial submodel, i.e., a subset of the universe of A
together with the inherited structure. Thus for models in signatures without functional symbols,
fragments are just submodels; while for models in signatures with functional symbols, operations
on fragments can be partial. A fragment can be considered as a submodel of the corresponding
model in the purely predicate language obtained from the original language by replacing each
functional symbol of arity ě 1 with a predicate symbol having the same interpretation. Clearly,
for any fragment there exists the smallest submodel including it, the submodel generated by the
fragment.
Let A be a model and I an ideal over A (the universe of A) with
Ť
I “ A. We shall say that
the system pBiqiPI of models (in the same signature) is coherent in A iff for every i P I, the set i
is included into Bi (the universe of Bi) and the fragments of A and of Bi given by i coincide.
As usual, an upper cone of a partially ordered set pP,ďq is an C Ď P which is upward closed,
i.e., such that b P C whenever a ď b for some a P C. Clearly, the set of upper cones of P generates
a filter over P whenever P is directed.
Lemma 9. Let pBiqiPI be coherent in A and D a filter over I extending the filter generated
by upper cones of pI,Ďq. Then A isomorphically embeds into B :“
ś
D Bi, the product of the
models Bi reduced by D.
Proof. For each i P I we fix some bi P Bi, and for each a P A, let ca P
ś
iPI Bi be the function
defined by letting for all i P I,
capiq :“
"
a if a P i,
bi otherwise.
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Now define f : AÑ B by letting for all a P A,
fpaq :“ rcasD,
and check that f is an isomorphic embedding of A into B.
Let R be an n-ary predicate symbol in our signature. We must check that for all a0, . . . , an´1
in A,
RApa0, . . . , an´1q iff R
Bpfpa0q, . . . , fpan´1qq.
Since
Ť
I “ A, for any k ă n there is ik P I with ak P Bik , and since I is an ideal,
Ť
kăn ik P I.
Moreover, since i Ď Bi for all i P I, whenever
Ť
kăn ik Ď i then takukăn Ď Bi and ak “ cakpiq,
and so, since the fragments of A and Bi given by i coincide, R
Apa0, . . . , an´1q is equivalent to
RBipca0piq, . . . , can´1piqq. Thus we have:
RApa0, . . . , an´1q iff
 
i P I : RBipca0piq, . . . , can´1piqq
(
is an upper cone of I
iff
 
i P I : RBipca0piq, . . . , can´1piqq
(
P D
where one implication in the second equivalence holds since D extends the filter generated by
upper cones of I while the converse implication holds since the property inherits upward. Finally,
the latter assertion is equivalent to RBprca0 sD, . . . , rcan´1 sDq by definition of reduced products,
and thus to RBpfpa0q, . . . , fpan´1qq, as required.
Let now F be an n-ary functional symbol in the signature. We must check that for all
a0, . . . , an´1 in A,
fpFApa0, . . . , an´1qq “ F
Bpfpa0q, . . . , fpan´1qq.
Indeed,
fpFApa0, . . . , an´1qq “ rcFApa0,...,an´1qsD
while
FBpfpa0q, . . . , fpan´1qq “ F
Bprca0 sD, . . . , rcan´1 sDq “ rbsD
where bpiq “ FBipca0piq, . . . , can´1piqq.
Again, if for k ă n, ik P I is such that ak P Bik , and also in P I is such that F
Apa0, . . . , an´1q P Bin ,
whenever
Ť
kďn ik Ď i then cFApa0,...,an´1qpiq “ F
Apa0, . . . , an´1q “ F
Bipa0, . . . , an´1q and also
FBipca0piq, . . . , can´1piqq “ F
Bipa0, . . . , an´1q. It follows rcFApa0,...,an´1qsD “ rbsD, as required.
The proof is complete.
Remark 2. In general, even if D is an ultrafilter and all theBi are submodels of A, the embedding
is not elementary, and moreover, A and B are not elementarily equivalent, even in the sense of
Lω,ω. E.g., let A “ pω,ăq and Bi “ pi,ăq for all finite i Ď ω. Then if ϕ is Dx@y px ă yq, we
have: A ( ϕ, but for all i, Bi (  ϕ, and hence, B (  ϕ.
Remark 3. If the ideal I is κ-complete, i.e.,
Ť
E P I for all E P PκpIq, then Lemma 9 remains
true even for signatures involving ăκ-ary symbols. Let us point out also that whenever I is
κ-complete then so is the filter DI over I generated by upper cones in pI,Ďq (but of course not
any filter D extending DI), and that in the case I “ PκpAq, DI is the least κ-complete fine filter
over PκpAq.
The theorem below is the main result of this note; it extends Corollary 3 by providing new
characterizations – syntactical in item (iii) and semantical in items (iv) and (v) – of the case when
ϑpϕq is equivalent to a first-order formula.
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Theorem 10. Let κ be ω or, more generally, a compact cardinal and ϕ a sentence in the lan-
guage Lκ,κ in a signature τ with ă κ functional (including constant) symbols. The following are
equivalent:
(i) ϑpϕq is equivalent to a Σ0
1
pLκ,κq-sentence;
(ii) ϑpϕq is equivalent to an Lκ,κ-sentence;
(iii) ϑpϕq is equivalent to a Π1
1
pL2κ,κq-sentence;
(iv) any model satisfying ϕ has a fragment of cardinality ă κ such that each model having the
fragment satisfies ϑpϕq;
(v) there exists λ ă κ such that any model satisfying ϕ has a fragment of cardinality ď λ and
such that each model having the fragment satisfies ϑpϕq.
Proof. (i)Ñ(ii) and (ii)Ñ(iii). Trivial.
(iii)Ñ(iv). Assume that (iv) does not hold. Then there is A such that A ( ϕ, and for every
set i Ď A of size ă κ, there exists a model Bi such that i Ď Bi, the fragments of A and of Bi
given by i coincide, and Bi has no submodels satisfying ϕ, thus Bi (  ϑpϕq. Let B :“
ś
D Bi
where D is a κ-complete ultrafilter over PκpAq which is fine, i.e., extends the filter generated by
the sets ti P PκpAq : a P iu for all a P A (recall that the existence of such an ultrafilter follows
from the compactness of κ; see, e.g., [6], Corollary 22.18). By Lemma 9, A isomorphically embeds
into B; therefore, B ( ϑpϕq. Let us show that (iii) fails.
Indeed, if ϑpϕq is equivalent to a Π1
1
pL2κ,κq-formula, then  ϑpϕq is equivalent to a Σ
1
1
pL2κ,κq-
formula, and hence, is preserved under ultraproducts by κ-complete ultrafilters (as was pointed
out in the proof of Corollary 6), whence we get also B (  ϑpϕq; a contradiction.
(iv)Ñ(v). Assume that (v) does not hold. Let us again use an ultraproduct argument: for
any α ă κ pick a model Aα which satisfies ϕ and does not have fragments of size ď λ generating
submodels satisfying ϕ, pick any κ-complete ultrafilter D over κ, and consider A :“
ś
D Aα.
Clearly, A satisfies ϕ. Let us show that A does not have fragments of size ă κ generating
submodels satisfying ϕ, thus proving that (iv) fails.
Indeed, if there is λ ă κ such that A has some λ-generated submodel satisfying ϕ, i.e., A (
ϑďλpϕq, then this fact is expressed by a first-order (and even existential) sentence by Lemma 8,
and hence, should hold in Aα for D-almost all α, which is, however, not true.
(v)Ñ(i). Assume (v). Then ϑpϕq is equivalent to ϑďλpϕq, which is equivalent to a Σ
0
1
pLκ,κq-
sentence by Lemma 8, thus proving (i).
The theorem is proved.
Corollary 11. Let κ be ω or, more generally, a compact cardinal and ϕ a sentence in Lκ,κ in
a signature without functional symbols. The following are equivalent:
(i) ϑpϕq is equivalent to a sentence in Lκ,κ (or Σ
0
1
pLκ,κq, or Π
1
1
pL2κ,κq);
(ii) any model satisfying ϕ has a submodel of cardinality ă κ satisfying ϕ (or ϑpϕq);
(iii) there exists λ ă κ such that any model satisfying ϕ has a submodel of cardinality ď λ
satisfying ϕ (or ϑpϕq).
Proof. As in such signatures the notions of fragments and submodels coincide, this follows from
Theorem 10.
Example 4. Recall that models in signatures having only unary functional symbols are called
unoids, and if such a symbol is unique, unars.
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Let a signature τ consist of a single unary functional symbol F . Let ϕ be the Lω,ω-sentence
Dx F pxq ‰ x in τ . Then ϑpϕq is equivalent to ϕ itself. Clearly, the cardinality λ ă ω of a finite
fragment determining satisfiability of ϑpϕq in submodels extending it, stated in Theorem 10 (v),
is 1; note that there are models of ϕ without finite submodels at all (e.g., so is the free 1-generated
unar pω, Sq where S is the successor operation).
More generally, let τ consist of κ unary functional symbols Fα, α ă κ, and let ϕ be the
Lκ`,ω-sentence Dx
Ž
αăκ Fαpxq ‰ x in τ . Then again, ϑpϕq is equivalent to ϕ, λ is 1, and there
are models of ϕ without submodels of size ă κ (e.g., any free τ -unoid).
Example 5. Let a signature τ consist of a single binary predicate symbol R.
Let ϕ be the Lω,ω-sentence Dx@y Rpx, yq in τ . Then ϑpϕq is equivalent to DxRpx, xq, and
λ from Corollary 11 (iii) is 1. Observe that ϕ is in Σ0
2
zΠ0
2
. Indeed, assume that ϕ is in Π0
2
.
Recall that Π0
2
-formulas are characterized as those that are preserved under chain unions (see [7],
Theorem 3.2.2). Let An be pn`1,ěq, and let A be the union of the chain of the An, n P ω. Then
An ( ϕ for all n P ω but A (  ϕ; a contradiction.
Let also ψ be the Lω,ω-sentence @x Dy Rpx, yq in τ . Then ϑpψq is not equivalent to any Lω,ω-
sentence. Indeed, the model pω,ăq satisfies ψ but includes no finite submodels satisfying ψ; apply
Corollary 11 (iii). Similar arguments show that ψ is in Π0
2
zΣ0
2
and that ϑp ψq is Dx Rpx, xq
while ϑp ϕq is not equivalent to any Lω,ω-sentence.
Remark 6. Although any ϕ with the first-order expressible ϑpϕq determines the least size of
a small fragment from Theorem 10, which is thus independent of a particular model, it does not
determine, even up to isomorphism, the fragment itself. E.g., if ϕ is any true formula then ϑpϕq
is equivalent to ϕ; hence in a purely predicate signature τ the discussed size is 1 but there can
be many non-isomorphic single-point models – arbitrarily many in an appropriate τ .
Remark 7. Despite the low complexity of the first-order expressible ϑpϕq, the complexity of ϕ itself
can be much higher: there exist non-first-order expressible ϕ with first-order expressible ϑpϕq.
Let ϕ state the finiteness, i.e., let any model satisfy ϕ iff it is finite. As well-known, ϕ is not
Lω,ω-expressible (though is expressible in Lω1,ω or else in the weak second-order language; see,
e.g., [2]). However, in any signature without functional symbols, ϑpϕq is equivalent to any true
formula. This example is generalized to the languages Lκ,κ with arbitrarily large κ.
Remark 8. Theorem 10 (and Corollary 11) remains true even for signatures with ăκ-ary symbols;
for Lemmas 8 and 9 this has been already noticed, other arguments in the proof do not require
any modifying.
Remark 9. The results of this note admit further improvements and generalizations.
First, in Theorem 10 (and Corollary 11) it suffices to assume that κ is inaccessible. Moreover,
for κ ą ω, if a sentence ϕ in Lκ,κ holds in a model then it holds in its submodel of size ă κ (see,
e.g., [2], Corollary 3.1.3), hence ϑpϕq is equivalent to ϑďλpϕq for some λ ă κ; then items (i)–(v)
of Theorem 10 follow due to Lemma 8 (even in a nicer form with submodels instead of fragments,
like as in Corollary 11).
Further, the obtained results can be relativized to theories T in a given language. Another
natural generalization concerns the question when ϑpT q is equivalent to some theory in the same
language.
Question 10. Characterize first-order sentences ϕ for which ϑpϕq are first-order sentences in Lω,ω.
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